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Summary: The aim of this paper is to assess theoretical consequences of restructuring
electricity markets on the environment. We examine changes in potential behaviours in
consumption-side as well as in supply-side. We show that restructuring and following
access to competition is not neutral from an environmental standpoint. Deregulation
could induce some negative externalities due to requirements in cost-e±ciency. The prin-
cipal result of this paper is the need of strong incentives in public policies to compensate
the new short-term horizon in which energy sector's ¯rms are evolving, particularly
concerning R&D.
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11 Introduction and preliminary comments
The issue of deregulation has at length been debated, and today even if largely adopted,
it is still contested. Considering the deregulation as an established fact, a new relevant
topic is to know whether this process should lead to a better or a worse situation in terms
of environment. The question is far from being obvious because of the multiplicity of
factors to take into account. Two major di±culties emerge. First, su±cient time series
do not exist to con¯rm or to invalidate theoretical assumptions and it is premature
to make conclusive statements about the environmental impact of deregulation. Our
aim will be here to put these assumptions into perspective with ¯rst observations in
countries where liberalization is already well underway. Second, it appears also di±cult
to consider the pure e®ects of restructuring on the environment, without taking into
account changes due to others factors, as general growth or technology advances.
Three kinds of actors can modify the level of emissions due to electricity generation:
consumers (demand-side), generators (supply-side) and regulators by having an e®ect
on the ¯rst two. To ful¯l socially optimal environmental requirements, regulation can
in°uence the quantity demanded, but also the quality desired by informed and educated
consumers.
Concerning the supply-side, the need for competitiveness involves a drastic decline in
non essential expenditures and an optimization of investment, principally the choice of
the fuel mix. Then, R&D programs and demand-side-management (DSM) programs are
declining, when not disappearing. In addition to the cost pressure, uncertainty leads
producers to sub-optimal decisions. Uncertainty appears under di®erent forms, from
regulatory uncertainty, to technological or input price risks.
The second and third sections analyze potential consequences in the demand-side and the
supply-side respectively. The fourth section explains the accentuating role of uncertainty
2on previously mentioned elements. The ¯fth section put the accent on the remaining ma-
jor issue; we mean the underinvestment in energy R&D following deregulation. Section
six concludes.
2 The Demand-Side
This section aims to present potential e®ects from restructuring in a consumer stand-
point. Beyond an expected price e®ect, depending on price-elasticity, demand can also
be in°uenced by demand-side-management programs and system reliability.
2.1 A basic price e®ect
Above all, deregulation is often expected to result in lower prices due to competition. The
primary basic e®ect is then a higher demand, which could ceteris paribus lead to higher
carbon emissions from electricity generation (Palmer, 1999). This possible increase may
be due to both spatial and temporal arbitrages.
2.1.1 Interconnection and spatial considerations
Depending on initial situations, prices will not necessarily fall in all areas. For instance, if
the local regulated utility is a low-cost supplier of electricity compared to its neighbours,
prices could rise. The local utility would have, in this case, an incentive to serve more
pro¯table customers in neighbourly areas and local demand should be completed by
more high-cost suppliers. The latter could be utilities close to the initial area or new
entrants (Burtraw et al. 2000). Fall in prices is then not a systematic consequence and
emission levels may not increase in all regions. However, due to higher level in emissions
from low-cost baseload generation, overall e®ect is expected to be negative.
32.1.2 On-peak and o®-peak arbitrage
A symmetric argument can be found in time dimension. Deregulation allows utilities
to create more precisely adapted contracts for individual or industrial customers to
produce more widespread use of time-di®erentiated pricing of electricity (Palmer, 1999).
In this framework, a shift of demand away from peak periods to o®-peak periods could
be expected. Consequences for the environment are related to the nature of baseload
generation compared to peak generation. In France, for instance, such a shift would
produce fewer emissions because of the nuclear baseload. In the United States, due to
the coal-¯red baseload generation, such a change would lead to a sensible increase of
emissions.
2.2 Demand Side Management (DSM)
In order to reduce the total amount of electricity demanded, especially during peak
periods, electric generators were required, prior to deregulation, to devote a portion of
their revenues to DSM. A ¯rst motivation was that utilities were expected to be keenly
aware of the characteristics of their consumers. Then revenues' allocation seemed to be
better. But an observed consequence from the opening to competition seems to be the
dramatic decline of these programs (York and Kushler, 2002). In the absence of a new
policy initiative, the carbon emission savings attributable to past DSM and conservation
e®orts by utilities may be lost in a competitive market (Palmer, 1999).
DSM is a major issue in an environmental perspective. Power savings generally reduce
production from marginal units, which is more polluting (diesel generation), with an
evident positive consequence on the emission level. DSM often takes the form of demand
response (DR) which refers to programs that encourage electricity customers to reduce
demand or operate on-site generators during periods of high loads and/or high prices.
If DR capacities were used to meet reserve requirements, signi¯cant emission reductions
4could result (Keith et al. 2004). But DR programs, and more generally DSM initiatives
would be signi¯cantly improved by a greater price transparency. Today, only a negligible
quantity of transactions occurring in spot and forward or futures markets are accessible
to the public (Borenstein, 2002). Despite of arguments put forward by marketers, one
can not help to think that electricians want to preserve their industry as an opaque one.
Thus consumers often have no information about price formation and cannot operate
any arbitrages.
2.3 Reliability and the Distributed Generation Question
Even if not obvious at ¯rst sight, reliability and carbon emissions are closely linked.
Reliability is the product of resource adequacy and resource availability. Typically,
regulators impose a required reserve margin - about 15 to 20% above peak load - for each
utility, through contracts with others generators or through their own reserve capacity
(see Cooke and Sangiovanni (2004), or Joskow and Tirole (2004) for a very more technical
paper). Insu±ciency in margin levels can lead to outages (Borenstein, 2002), which are
extremely damageable for some very dependent industries (aluminium, micro-processors,
and other high technologies). If customers are not supplied with safe and reliable power
at a reasonable price, they have a strong incentive to invest in backup generation, often
diesel generators, widely known as distributed generation (DG).
3 The supply-side
3.1 The issue of the optimal fuel mix
Independently from the growth of consumption, the ¯rst factor in°uencing emission level
is the change in fuel mix. In a new competitive framework, generators have to reduce
their costs (Dooley, 1998). Green (2004) assumes that competition in electricity markets
5today follows a price game, rather than a quantity game or Cournot competition. This
is due to a better monitoring from the regulator (Green's paper analyzes the case of
the previous British pool) and consequent fewer possibilities in capacity withholding
(Wolak and Patrick, 1997). As a result, production costs become the decisive variable
to compete.
In this context, electricity producers must adapt their fuel mix to enhance productive
e±ciency and remain competitive. In addition, present choices must be put in perspec-
tives with future environmental decisions and features as °exibility or low-intensity in
capital are crucial.
3.1.1 The gas miracle
Concerning natural gas, the most relevant example is the United Kingdom. Frequently
labelled the "dirty man" of Europe from the 1950s to the 1980s, the UK had to solve
the acid rain problem, imputed to coal-¯red power stations (Villot, 1996). In 1990, coal
is still used as 65% of power generation and the electricity supply industry accounted
for more than 70% (Eikeland, 1998). Thus taking into account the environmental issue,
natural gas has been the new choice of fuel, since the competitive reform process started
in 1989. Remember that switch from coal to gas results in both a reduction in carbon
emissions and a dramatic reduction in emissions of SO2. In fact, the principal pollutants
from gas-¯red plants are nitrogen oxides, which cause ozone pollution and act as a
greenhouse gas (GHG), and carbon dioxide, a principal GHG. But overall, emissions
from gas-¯red generation facilities are signi¯cantly lower than from coal-¯red generation.
In addition, qualities of gas for electricity production are numerous: high-e±ciency,
modularity and a very short lead-time for bringing these units online (Burtraw et al.,
2000). Note that these features - essentially °exibility - are fundamental in a competitive
environment. Consequently, when new entrants started to use cleaner combined cycle
6Source: CATF, 2002 
Figure 1: Planned capacity additions in the US (Clean Air Task Foce, 2002)
gas turbine (CCGT), National Power and PowerGen - the new privatized generation
companies - were forced to respond with their own CCGT projects and the vast majority
of new generating capacity are either natural gas-¯red combined-cycle (baseload duty)
or simple gas turbines (peak-load duty). Of course, another motivation was to get on
with the 1992 Environment White Paper from the re-elected Conservative government
of John Major, but competition remains the ¯rst and main motivation (Eikeland, 1998).
In the same way, market penetration of natural gas is particularly noteworthy. Figure I
clearly show the US choice of gas to generate electricity. In California, Pennsylvania and
Texas - more advanced states in terms of deregulation - between 1995 and 2001, more
than 80% of the new generating capacity (91200 MW) were natural gas (Sverrisson et
al., 2003).
At present, because of the volatility and the less availability of the resource, natural gas
7is a bit less interesting compared to other energy sources (American Gas Foundation,
2003). We will come back to this point later, in the next section.
3.1.2 The always competitive coal
A strong relationship exists between coal and electricity. Coal currently provides fuel for
37% of the world's electricity generation and power plants represent by far the largest
group of coal end users, consuming 60% of the world-wide coal production to produce
heat and generate electricity (APERC, 2000). Some countries (Germany, France or the
UK) have a long history with coal dating back to the time of the Industrial Revolution.
Further, coal displays several advantages in the deregulation and competitive framework.
First, in some regions coal is both abundant and relatively cheap to mine (open-pit
mines). For instance, Victoria (Australia), the US or China have very large coal sectors
due to the great availability of the resource. In these cases, the issue is di®erent from
European cases, where coal is no more economically extractable, independently from en-
vironmental considerations. Where coal is abundant, competition is a constant incentive
to invest in coal-¯red plant despite of the emissions.
Next, public policies sometimes have put other resources at a disadvantage compared
to coal. In China, natural gas has been virtually ignored as fuel and considered as a
by-product of oil production. The price has been historically regulated at levels allowing
fertilisation on a small scale and no incentive exists to exploit the resource. Consequently,
gas only constitutes 2% of fuel consumed in China (Williams, 1999). In the US, distortion
in competition arises because of di®erentiated rules for older stations. In fact, older coal-
¯red plants bene¯t from an exemption from the New Source Review under the Clean Air
Act. These plants are not supposed to install best available pollution control technology
as other new stations have to do (York, 2003). Generators owning these old plants thus
have an unfair competitive advantage. In Occidental Europe, distortion comes from
8social considerations (246000 employees for British Coal in March 1984 and 74000 in
March 1991). These legitimate considerations were the source of multiple subsidies,
which have contributed to the postponement of closure of many mines (Burtraw et al.,
2000). In these three cases, consequences on the environment are obviously negative.
Finally, the short run outlook perfectly corresponds with the ¯red-coal generation (Lee
and Darani, 1996). Considering how long this technology has been extended, coal plants
are often both amortized and underutilized. Consequently, cost-based considerations are
only almost from generators in a competitive framework which should entail an increase
in emissions. In addition, because of relative short supply and price volatility of natural
gas, coal becomes again relatively attractive, despite the environmental comparative
disadvantage (see uncertainty section).
3.1.3 Prospects for nuclear generation
Penetration of nuclear is very heterogeneous through countries (cf. ¯gure IV). In the
US, about 20% of electricity is generated by nuclear. But some regions in the world
do not use this technology because of a lack of know-how or the negative perception
of population, often linked with the radioactive waste issue. Beyond the problem of
acceptability, this led nevertheless Italy, Sweden (2010) or Germany (2030) to phase out
nuclear generation in the near future; nuclear generation reveals some disadvantages in
a competitive framework. Despite being a zero-emitting source of generation, and thus
a comparative advantage under environmental regulation, nuclear power plants may
not be able to recover their operating costs - fuel, operation, maintenance and safety
requirements costs - (Bernow et al., 1998). In addition, nuclear generation is also a
major source of potentially stranded costs on the eve of restructuring. For instance, the
UK government sold in 1996 the eight most advanced nuclear plants for $2.2 billions,
corresponding to the costs of all but one of the plants.
9Figure 2: Contribution of the sources to the European production in 2003
This comparative disadvantage leads, for example in the US, to an early retirement of
nuclear plants, leading meanwhile to a signi¯cant increase in emissions. Note however
that some improvements are expected, inspired by competition, increasing e±ciency in
the surviving stations. Moreover some e±ciency gains are already observed - nearly 10%
in the US - allowing keeping nuclear plants on-line longer (Kushler et al., 2004). But
no new nuclear project is planned - the French EPR project is an exception - leading to
future potential increases in emissions compared to the present situation.
3.1.4 The future of renewables
As nuclear, renewables are zero-emitting emissions sources and thus incredible opportuni-
ties to ful¯l environmental commitments (Lenssen and Flavin, 1996). Their development
is however very variable through regions, depending on past public policies, development
of technology and natural possibilities. Wind energy is an illustration. Absent in the
great majority of countries, insigni¯cant in the US - less than 1% -, the wind-powered
electricity represents 4.7% in Germany and about 20% in Denmark. These di®erences
remain due to the relative high-cost of green technologies compared to other sources,
political support becoming an absolutely essential condition (Parker and Blodgett, 2002).
In some countries, "green power" service packages - a variable percentage of renewable-
10based electricity - are available to customers for a premium above the conventional
market price (see the UK for example).This voluntary approach - in opposition to col-
lective payment approach (in comparison with the two methods, see Wiser (2003)) -
and following development of these packages is linked with the well-known problem of
the willingness-to-pay (WTP). To by-pass the WTP issue, a renewable portfolio stan-
dard (RPS) approach can be carried out. The RPS requires that some percentage of
total generation sold in a region comes from renewable sources, results depending on the
chosen percentage.
More than other electricity sources, renewable development is a public decision prob-
lem. Due to the current higher generation costs (see table I), compared to fossil fuel
sources (Glaser, 1999), renewables have to be integrated in a global policy for a sus-
tainable development by means of direct or indirect subsidies (APERC, 2000). A new
practice is particularly interesting from both environmental and reliability standpoints:
Net metering. Net metering is the possibility of allowing customers with small renewable
generating facilities that are interconnected with the local distribution company to sell
all generation in excess of their own demand back to the grid at retail rates, e®ectively
allowing the meter to run backwards. This provision creates an incentive for electricity
consumers to install small-scale on-site renewable generation, thereby reducing the need
for generation from conventional sources (Burtraw et al. 2000).
4 The key role of uncertainty
In this section, we explain how uncertainty in°uences decision from generators and
industrial consumers. We show that market risk generally a®ects negatively agents'
decisions in terms of environmental considerations. Investment is reduced or postponed
due to the higher cost of capital and potential future stranded costs. Capacity margins
are also reduced to enhance competitiveness leading to resort to DG. For industrial














































1,367  33.7  2.0  8,000  0.9  1.1  152  2.8  75%  4.0 
Conventional Gas/Oil 
Combined Cycle  536  12.3  2.0  7,500  2.9  3.1  59  1.1  75%  4.2 
Conventional
Combustion Turbine  409  10.2  4.1  10,939  4.2  4.6  45  4.2  15%  8.8 
Wind  1,003  26.1  0.0        0.0  111  5.2  30%  5.2 
Solar Photovoltaic  3,915  10.1  0.0        0.0  434  25.3  20%  25.3 
DG - Fuel Cells  –         
5 MW (*)  1,897  10 mills/kWh  6,426  2.5  3.5  210  3.2  75%  6.7 
DG - IC Diesel – 500 
kW (*)  508  5 mills/kWh  8,856  3.3  3.8  56  4.3  15%  8.1 
DG - Gas Combustion 
Turbine - 500 kW (*)  619  9 mills/kWh  9,707  3.7  4.6  69  5.2  15%  9.9 
Real Rate of Return is 12 percent 
Inflation is 3 percent 
Assumptions in 
calculating final energy 
cost (not from EIA): 
30-year payback period 
Source of cost data: Energy Information Administration, 2003, except “Fuel Cell” and “IC Diesel” (*), which are based on data from 
Onsite Sycom Energy Corporation (2000). For those two technologies, fixed and variable O&M costs are shown combined. Therefore,
“Fixed O&M” is included in “Total Variable Cost” and not under “Total Fixed Cost”. 
Table 1: Production costs of di®erent generating technologies
customers, con¯dence into the supply system is essential. Regulation, by improving
reliability, can enhance the consumer's con¯dence and then moderate emissions from
DG units.
4.1 Uncertainty in Regulation and investment
We know since Dixit and Pindyck (1994), that uncertainty has a strong in°uence on
investment, particularly when investors are risk averse. This is the case for instance
concerning regulation uncertainty. When players do not know the rules, they prefer to
wait. By postponing their investments, decisions are generally not optimal regarding
the environment.
12Optimal investment planning is a necessary condition to end up in an e±cient electricity
generation sector. Restructuring and competition could induce some changes in invest-
ment policy from generators, ¯rstly owing to the threat of future stranded costs and
secondly because of the uncertainties about next regulation rules.
The issue of stranded costs is a major one in a deregulation process. If prices decline
under competition, the price no longer meets the required revenue to cover the remainder
of the existing capital investment of the utility. Therefore, in countries that have not yet
restructured, potential future stranded costs act as a brake in investment. Nevertheless,
following Sverrisson et al. (2003), in the US, states that have restructured have shown
that full stranded cost recovery is almost assured. If full compensation is guaranteed,
then producers are - relatively - less reticent to invest in higher-intensive capital plants.
4.2 Reliability and con¯dence
As seen in the second section, reliability is a major issue when speaking about the envi-
ronment. Uncertainty concerning the quality of supply leads to build private emergency
capacity, when pro¯ts are very sensitive to outages. In order to avoid a too strong
growth of distributed generation, regulator has to improve system quality and to choose
su±cient margin levels (Joskow 2003).
Furthermore, increasing quality theoretically allows reducing additional capacity, be-
cause of the less probability of failures. This point must be noted when, as nowadays,
sites available to build new plants on are relatively rare.
4.3 Volatility and Production Choices: The substitutability of inputs
At present, the risk of volatile natural gas prices (illustrated in ¯gure II), which is far
greater than in the case of coal, would tend to drive investment away from gas-¯red































































































































































































Figure 3: Natural gas prices in major US hubs
generation and slow the rate of entry of new gas combined cycle units. Paroush and
Wolf (1992) have shown that for risk-averse decision-makers, volatility is a disadvantage
for a particular input when compared to other substitutable inputs.
The American Gas Association report (2003) explains in an exhaustive manner why gas
markets are more and more volatile and whether this volatility should go on or espe-
cially increases. Because of the natural gas volatility and if one assumes that economic
actors are risk-averse, substitutable fuels become comparatively more competitive. As
in the generation segment, investment could also be reduced in the upstream natural
gas industry. This decline in gas production and possible lack in supply may in return
increase tension in gas markets, and support volatility (Forbes and Zampelli, 2004).
145 The new challenge: Innovation and Competition in En-
ergy
On the whole, R&D budgets have fallen because of their weight in ¯nal production cost.
Empirically, competition has really a negative in°uence on R&D propensity to invest.
Except for Japan and Switzerland, expenditures have been dramatically reduced from
mid 1980s (Dooley, 1998): -88% for the UK, -74% for Germany and -75% for Italy (only
-9% for the US). Even if those drastic cuts occurred principally in the nuclear domain,
coal energy R&D has been cut back also. Consequences could be extremely serious
considering stagnant position of coal in the US and growing reliance on coal in the Asia
Paci¯c region (APERC, 2000).
In addition, Munari (2002) points out that, consequences are not only in terms of scale
in R&D. An impact also exists concerning the composition and funding of R&D ac-
tivities. Generally, companies reduce the allocation of resources to long-term activities
and de¯ned a more balanced allocation towards applied research and development. Con-
cretely, an internal market among the research divisions and the operating units emerges.
Companies now determine the economic viability of R&D by measuring its capacity to
provide shorter-term innovations at a least cost.
Theoretically, Arrow (1962) showed fewer incentives to invest in R&D in a competition
environment. Two solutions (or a mix) are then possible. First, fundamental research
can be sustained by governments. But today, governments follow the trend. Many
governmental energy R&D programs have shifted in focus from long-term (fundamen-
tal or system research) to short-term research (competitive research). It may not be
as disastrous as it appears primarily. A number of technologies will underpin the next
generation of energy power sources that already exist commercially, or are close to com-
mercialisation. Second, if it is assumed that the global volume of R&D is insu±cient,
15the desired amount could be reached by private research, but in a collusive framework,
for example with joint-venture (for theoretical papers, see: D'Aspremont and Jacquemin
1988 or Kamien et al. 1992).
The ideal solution may be the Italian Ministry's one. Observing changes in focus of
R&D due to the opening-up of the Italian electricity generation market to competition,
government decided to create an independent research company owned not only by Enel
(previous monopoly) but also by new generators. This new organization, widely based
on the previous Enel R&D, is funded by a sort of R&D tax. The announced role is to
be in charge of the entire "system research".
The issue of innovation is crucial because of its intergenerational impact. Facing emerg-
ing risk, as global warming, energy R&D cannot be neglected (Margolis and Kammen,
1999). In addition, it is well-known that only 10 "developed" countries contribute to
96% of the international energy innovation. Then, these countries are not only signif-
icant drivers for global research, they are the research. Consequently, spillovers from
national under-investments may lead to a tragic and irreversible situation.
6 Concluding remarks: The role of regulation
In the ¯eld of environmental consequences of electricity restructuring, the only consensus
is the expectation that prices will decrease and consumption should increase. Even
this consensus may be doubtful if externalities are taken into account, and they should
be in present policies. However, most studies appear to give pessimistic conclusions
concerning the environment. These conclusions seem realistic even if changes in the
fuel mix could lighten global e®ects (Geller and Kubo, 2000). Knowing expected e®ects
from restructuring electricity and considering as essential the environmental issue, public
policies have now to shift the emphasis of noticed trends (Biewald, 1997).
16First by in°uencing demand level, because in a way one could say that the cleanest kWh
is a non-produced kWh. As seen before, DSM programs have di±culties to emerge in
competition and regulation has a role to play in this major issue, in particular when
speaking about emerging economies. Figure III shows the trends in carbon and energy
intensity in the US since 1970. Perhaps humanity could not a®ord the luxury of leaving
new economies follow the path followed by our industrialized countries in the past, par-
ticularly considering growth rates observed in these new economies. Most economically
developed countries have then to become models for developing ones and regulation may
or should be a pertinent instrument (remember that the US was responsible for 23% of
all energy-related carbon emissions world-wide).
Secondly by educating consumers and making them sensitive to the problem. This step
is fundamental and takes place prior to any other measures. A change in mentalities
would allow savings in power today, but also to adopt more severe proposals in the
future.
Necessary too, measures for the supply-side have to direct the next generation towards
cleaner fuels. In fact, even if regulation is often understood as a competition guarantor
(Mansur 2004), its role is also to give strong incentives to improve the global pollution
situation.
Firstly adapted rules are necessary concerning reliability. The issue remains that peak
demand is being met in some part by many small diesel generators. The impact on
pollutant emissions during peak load periods can then be signi¯cant. Due to the decline
in reliability (Italy, US, Canada, Sweden and Denmark; see Cooke and Sangiovanni,
2004) more DG are coming online. Even if some of these units appear positively bene¯cial
in the emission issue, when they combine heat and power (CHP) for instance, some of
them are installed without concern for overall e±ciency. Without taking into account
the problem in a global manner emissions may increase.
17Figure 4: Carbon and energy intensity in the US (100 in 1970)
An optimal transportation cost should protect regions with a larger part of renewables
from ¯red-coal regions (Palmer and Burtraw, 1997). In this case, low transportation
costs may have a very negative impact on the environment. Note that a symmetric case
exists when speaking about hydro-powered areas, which could supply more polluted areas
(Quebec, Tasmania or Scandinavia (Amundsen and Tj¿tta, 1999) are some examples).
Thus pragmatism is the attitude to adopt because of the almost in¯nitely large range.
Decline observed in DSM budgets - voluntary approach - could be compensated by a tax
to preserve improvements in energy e±ciency, renewable energy and public bene¯t R&D.
In the US, system bene¯t charges (SBC) have emerged during restructuring. A surcharge
for each kWh of electricity has been implemented to encourage investment. Furthermore,
Sverrisson et al. (2003) argue that restructuring led to higher SBC rates. Even if the
analysis is partly biased, because restructured states were also less well-organized and
had a need of e±ciency, deregulation may have a positive e®ect on research. In addition,
SBC avoids the not socially optimal free-riding behaviours.
Nevertheless, to ful¯l environmental requirements at least cost, emissions trading (Dales,
1968) appear an e±cient solution, compared to command and control schemes (Weitz-
18man, 1974). Because of the scarcity of the resource, the ¯xed threshold is automatically
achieved. A ¯rst success is the experience of the SO2 trading scheme in the US (Stavins
1998). In Europe, a similar system should be implemented at the beginning of 2005,
but as for electricity and gas directives, delays might be required for a large majority of
members. In addition, emissions trading currently deliver its ¯rst weaknesses. Recent
studies have shown that exercise of market power may be enhanced by an emissions
credits market.
But the major issue remains the question of energy R&D in a new deregulated environ-
ment. This single issue challenge the whole deregulation process in itself. In addition to
relative negative consequences in terms of investment still observed in several newly lib-
eralized network industries, an established negative result concerning innovation would
lead undoubtedly to alterations concerning deregulation. Clearly, if energy R&D is not
su±ciently stimulated, energy industry would contribute to unsustainability.
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